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Abstract: Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) enables cooperation in an open and highly concurrent context. In this
paper, we investigate the management of personal information by an SOA service consumer while invoking
composed services, where we will study the balance between quality of service (that works better when pro-
vided with our personal data) and the consumer’s data access policy.We present a service architecture that is
based on an open epistemic multi-agent. We describe a logic-based trust module that a service consumer can
use to assess and explain his trust toward composed services (which are perceived as composed actions exe-
cuted by a group of agents in the system).We then illustrate our solution in a case study involving a professional
social network.
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we investigate the management of per-
sonal information by an SOA service consumer while
invoking composed services. Generally speaking,
managing personal information relates to different as-
pects of data management, such as storage, persis-
tence and querying. In this work, we focus on pri-
vacy and confidentiality in a business to user (b2u)
application and critical information dissemination in
business to business (b2b) solutions. Where we study
the balance between quality of service and the con-
sumer’s data access policy. We present a service ar-
chitecture based on an open multi-agent system where
agents provide and invoke (composed-)services in or-
der to achieve their goals. We describe a logic-based
trust module that a service consumer can use to as-
sess his trust toward composed services. Using an ab-
duction mechanism, we provide the service consumer
with a synthesized view of his beliefs about the cur-
rent state of the multi-agent system. This view is cou-
pled with an answer to the question: why should I
trust or not this composition? We then illustrate our
solution in a case study about a personal information
management system (PIMS) involving a professional
social network. We discuss how the CEO of a start-up
company, collects information about Alice, a poten-
tial recruit, while preserving his personal information,
using composed services provided by the members of
the network including Alice herself.
2 THE PIMS NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE
In a service based application, functions are encap-
sulated within what is called a service, where a set
of standards that describe the interaction protocol can
be used to interact with the service (Holley and Ar-
sanjani, 2010). A service consumer asks a service
provider to access some functionality that is provided
by one of his services. In order to provide complex
services, the base services can be composed for be-
having together as a composed service.
Our goal is to put the management of personal in-
formation in the center of SOA design. To achieve
this, we present a framework that is based on the con-
cept of personal information management system, ab-
breviated PIMS 1. A PIMS is a software entity that
is associated to an individual or an organization. Via
his PIMS, an agent can provide and summon services
in the network, while managing the access of his per-
sonal information. A PIMS is made up of the follow-
ing three major components.
Database. The PIMS database contains personal in-
formation about the owner of the PIMS. This data in-
cludes:
• Categorization data: it classifies the semantics of
the user’s personal information using an ontology;
1https://en.e-citiz.com/innovation/pimi-how-do-we-
take-take-of-you-personal-information.
• Key entries or values: this element corresponds to
the actual data in the PIMS;
• Metadata: this corresponds to non-functional
data, like an access policy that can be specified
using standards like XACML or EPAL (Khare,
2006).
Let D = {d1,d2, . . . ,dn} be the set of relevant data la-
bels.
Services Repository. In order to help the user to ex-
ecute services when playing the role of the service
provider, this component contains the description of a
set of services that other PIMS of the network can in-
voke. Such services provides at the same time access
to the owner’s personal information (upon request).
Query Interface. A query interface allow the user
to specify a goal to be achieved by composition of
the available services. a service composition compo-
nents uses then this query to provide a list of service
compositions that achieve the goal. These services
are then annotated by the PIMS’s trust module using
informations that can help the user to choose witch
one to execute(prediction of quality of service, trust
evaluation of the composition,etc.).
3 ILLUSTRATION: CASE STUDY
We present a case study about the process of retriev-
ing information in a professional social network.2
Suppose Bob is a member of a social network
who wants to gather information about Alice: more
precisely Bob would like to retrieve her curriculum
vitæ (CV), which includes the name of the owner of
the CV (identification reference), a proof of level in
English and a recent certified recommandation let-
ter (in our case, form Mr. Duval, one of Alice’s ex-
employer). Suppose that Bob also specifies that he
would like to stay anonymous while retrieving Alice’s
CV.
The service composition component provides
Bob with the following compositions to achieve his
goal:
Alice.cv() :where Alice offers to access a copy
of her CV. Figure 1 shows that her CV includes her
identification, her Cambridge proficiency in English
2We define a professional social network as a network
of PIMS where the users share their personal information
in order to look for job opportunities. This means that each
PIMS provides a way to access the network members infor-
mation via services.
Figure 1: Alice’s CV
mark (that she passed recently) and a recommenda-
tion letter from Mr. Duval, that is not certified. This
service does not ask any identification to be executed.
Pro.cv(): provided by a professional company
that offers to the network users access to information
about other users that it has gathered from different
sources. Pro.cv() offers the same services as
Alice.cv() ,with the exception that Pro.cv()
actually certifies M. Duval’s letter. Moreover,
Pro.cv() asks for an access fee of 10 euros, while
not asking Bob for any identification.
Composition1(): the user can construct the
CV by himself, using services that are available in
the network. This composition needs Alice’s name
(retrieved by querying her PIMS) and uses it to
collect Alice’s score at the TOEFL exam; it then
contacts Mr. Duval (whose contacts are provided by
Alice) and directly asks him for a recommendation
letter. Mr. Duval’s recommendation letter will be
certified. A drawback of this composition is that Bob
may retrieve an outdated TOEFL score. M. Duval
requires Bob’s identity in order to provide the recom-
mendation letter.
Then the trust module enters the scene in order to
analyze the three proposed compositions. The trust
module:
1. constructs a model of Bob’s knowledge about the
network;
2. analyzes the compositions using a formalization
of the concept of trust to be presented in Section 5;
3. asserts the trust value and generates a set of expla-
nations about the trust status.
In our example, the trust module generates the follow-
ing output.
• For Alice.cv(): trust towards this execution
fails, since the recommendation letter is not cer-
tified.
• For Composition1(): trust towards this execu-
tion will also fail, because the privacy requirement
is not met.
• For Pro.cv(): this composition satisfies all the
requirements for a positive trust value, but Bob is
notified that there is a fee.
Based on the annotations that the trust module has
provided to him, Bob may now decide which service
he wants to execute. He may decide to retract his pri-
vacy concerns (for example because he considers that
M. Duval can be trusted about keeping secret personal
information) and choose Composition1(). Bob may
as well accept to pay the transaction fees and pursue
the Pro.cv() service execution.
4 THE TRUST MODULE
As described above, our trust module takes into ac-
count the model that an agent constructs about the
network, in order to propose a set of annotations to-
ward possible action compositions. Interaction in the
PIMS network takes place according to the following
steps:
1. The user enters a query, describing the functional
properties of the service that he wants to invoke.
2. The composition module uses the query to pro-
pose a set of service compositions that are likely
to resolve the query.
3. Based on the user’s knowledge about the PIMS
network, his trust module adds trust-related an-
notations to the compositions so that an informed
choice can be made.
4. The user chooses the composition to be executed.
Figure 2: The Trust module.
So the trust module needs to assess the current
situation and provide information about the composi-
tion. In order to do so, we define the trust module (as
illustrated in Figure 2) by the following components.
Knowledge Base. In order to analyze the current
situation, the PIMS maintains a model of the current
state of the PIMS network. This model includes infor-
mation about the other PIMS (their beliefs about the
network and their goals and preferences) and prop-
erties of the network (resource availability, quality
of service of the different services that are available,
etc.). Such information may be deduced from past
interaction, knowledge of the user about the network
(including his own services for example) and infor-
mation provided by monitoring services. We suppose
that the knowledge base is written in the logic that we
are going to present in the next section.
Goal and Constraints. When initiating a new inter-
action, the trust component receives the description
of the query to be resolved (his goal) and the prefer-
ences of the user (a set of constraints) such as Bob’s
anonymity goal. This information enables the mod-
ule to build beliefs about service compositions that
resolve the query while guaranteeing the preferences
that were specified.
Model Checking. Trust is described in terms of a
belief about the conditions under which the user can
trust a composition to achieve his goal. Since our trust
module is based on a logical formalization, this is de-
scribed by a logical formula, and asserting trust is re-
duced to reasoning about its components. At this step,
we should be able to answer the question whether the
user should trust or not the current composition to
achieve the goal while respecting the user’s prefer-
ences.
Abductive Analysis. Once (dis)trust is asserted, an
abductive procedure associates to the current trust
value an explanation justifying it. This explanation is
displayed to the user in order to guide him in deciding
which composition to choose.
5 THE LOGIC
Our logic is a fairly standard multimodal logic of ac-
tion, belief, and choice that we call ABC and that
combines the logic for trust of (Herzig et al., 2010)
with the logic of assignments of (Balbiani et al.,
2013). The logic ABC is decidable.
There is a countable set of propositional vari-
ables P = {p,q, . . . } and a finite set of agent names
I = {i, j,k, . . . }. In the epistemic dimension of the lan-
guage, we have modal operators of belief Beli and
choice Chi, one per agent i ∈ I. Beliϕ reads “i be-
lieves that ϕ”, and Chiϕ reads “i chooses that ϕ”, or “i
prefers that ϕ”, where ϕ is a formula.
The dynamic dimension of the language is based
on assignments. An assignment is of the form either
p+ or p−, where p is a propositional variable from P;
p+ makes p true and p− makes p false. An authored
assignment is a couple of the form either 〈i, p+〉 or
〈i, p−〉, where i is an agent from I and p is a variable
from P. The intuition for the former is that i sets the
variable p to true; for the latter it is that i sets p to
false. For ease of notation we write i:+p and i:−p in-
stead of 〈i, p+〉 and 〈i, p−〉. An atomic action is a finite
set of authored assignments. Given an atomic action
δ and an agent i ∈ I, we define i’s part of δ as:
δ|i = {i:+p | i:+p ∈ δ}∪ {i:−p | i:+p ∈ δ}
The set of all atomic actions is noted ∆.
Beyond the modal operators Beli and Chi, our
language has two dynamic modal operators 〈.〉 and
〈〈.〉〉 the first of which is from Propositional Dynamic
Logic PDL. These operators have complex actions as
arguments. The formula 〈pi〉ϕ reads “the action pi is
executable and ϕ is true afterwards”. In contrast, for
〈〈pi〉〉ϕ reads “pi is executed and ϕ is true afterwards”.
The latter implies the former: when pi is executed then
pi clearly should be executable. It is also clear that the
other way round, executability should not imply exe-
cution.
Therefore 〈i:+p〉⊤ reads “i is able to set p to true”,
while 〈〈i:+p〉〉⊤ reads “i is going to set p to true”. The
formula 〈〈i:+p, j:−q〉〉ϕ expresses that the agents i and
j are going to assign the value ‘true’ to the proposi-
tional variable p and ‘false’ to q, and that afterwards
ϕ will be true; and Belk〈〈i:+p, j:−q〉〉ϕ expresses that
agent k believes that this is going to happen. As the
reader may have noticed, we drop the set parenthe-
ses around the atomic assignments in formulas such
as 〈i:+p〉⊤, 〈〈i:+p〉〉⊤ and 〈〈i:+p, j:−q〉〉ϕ.
Formally, we define by induction the set of actions
(programs) Prog and the set of well-formed formulas
Fml of ABC logic.
piF δ | skip | fail | pi;pi | if ψ then pi else pi
ϕF p | ⊤ | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | Beliϕ | Chiϕ | 〈pi〉ϕ | 〈〈pi〉〉ϕ
where p ranges over P, i over I and δ over ∆. Here is
an example of a complex action. Let L mean that the
light is on. Then if L then j:−L else j:+L describes
j’s action of toggling the light switch.
We use the standard abbreviations for ∨ and →.
Moreover, ⊥ abbreviates ¬⊤ and [pi]ϕ abbreviates
¬〈pi〉¬ϕ.
The formulas of our language have a semantics is
in terms of Kripke models and model updates, as cus-
tomary in dynamic epistemic logics (van Ditmarsch
et al., 2007). We do not go into the details of the se-
mantics here (see (Herzig et al., 2013)) and instead
rely on the reader’s intuitions. Here are some exam-
ples of validities:
• 〈〈pi〉〉⊤→ 〈pi〉⊤ (do implies can)
• Beliϕ→ Chiϕ (realistic choice)
• Chiϕ→ BeliChiϕ (positive introspection)
• ¬Chiϕ→ Beli¬Chiϕ (negative introspection)
• 〈〈 j:a〉〉⊤→ Ch j〈〈 j:a〉〉⊤ (intentional action)
It is decidable whether a formula is true in a given
ABC model. It is also decidable whether a formula is
satisfiable in the set of ABC models.
5.1 Formalizing Trust
We now turn to a formalization of a theory of trust
in complex actions in ABC logic. The trust theory
basically extends Castelfranchi and Falcone’s.
Among the different theories of trust, the cognitive
theory of Castelfranchi and Falcone, henceforth ab-
breviated C&F, is probably most prominent (Castel-
franchi and Falcone, 1998; Falcone and Castelfranchi,
2001).
According to C&F, the trust relation involves a
truster i, a trustee j, an action a that is performed by
j and a goal ϕ of i. They defined the predicate Trust
as a goal together with a particular configuration of
beliefs of the trustee. Precisely, i trusts j to do a in
order to achieve ϕ if and only if i has the goal that ϕ
and i believes that:
1. j is capable to perform a,
2. j is willing to perform a,
3. j has the power to achieve ϕ by doing a.
C&F distinguish external from internal conditions
in trust assessment: j’s capability to perform a is an
external condition, while j’s willingness to perform
a is an internal condition (being about the trustee’s
mental state). Finally, j’s power to achieve ϕ by do-
ing a relates internal and external conditions: if j per-
forms a then ϕ will result. Observe that in the power
condition, the result is conditioned by the execution
of a; therefore the power condition is independent
from the capability condition. In particular, j may
well have the power to achieve ϕ without being capa-
ble to perform a: for example, right now I have the
power to lift a weight of 50kg, but I am not capable to
do this because there is no such weight at hand.
We follow Jones who argued that the core notion
of trust need not involve a goal of the truster (Jones
and Firozabadi, 2001; Jones, 2002) and consider a
simplified version of C&F’s definition in terms of a
truster, a trustee, an action of the trustee, and an ex-
pected outcome of that action.
Complex action expressions involve multiple
agents that occur in the action expressions. We there-
fore need not identify the trustee as a separate argu-
ment of the trust predicate. Our official definition of
the trust predicate then becomes:
Trust(i,pi,ϕ)
def
= Beli(CExt(pi)∧CInt(pi)∧Res(pi,ϕ))
where Beli is a modal operator of belief and where
CExt(pi), CInt(pi), and Res(pi,ϕ) respectively corre-
spond to items 1, 2 and 3 in C&F’s definition. CExt
and CInt stand for the external and the internal con-
ditions in trust assessment. We prefer these terms and
notations because they better generalize to complex
actions. We also call CExt the executability condition
and CInt the execution condition. The modal opera-
tors Beli are already primitives of ABC logic. It re-
mains to define the other components of trust in ABC
logic:
CExt(pi)
def
= 〈pi〉⊤
CInt(pi)
def
= 〈pi〉⊤→ 〈〈pi〉〉⊤
Res(pi,ϕ)
def
= [pi]ϕ
The definition of the internal condition says that if pi
is executable then pi is going to happen. This is ac-
tually a bit weaker than C&F’s willingness condition.
To see this, consider the case where pi is an atomic
action a of some agent j, written j:a. If j cannot per-
form a, i.e., when the external condition fails to hold,
then the internal condition is trivially true. There is
however no harm here: as CExt( j:a) is false, the trust
predicate will be false anyway in that case. In the case
where the external condition holds the internal condi-
tion reduces to truth of 〈〈 j:a〉〉⊤, and as we have seen
in Section 5, 〈〈 j:a〉〉⊤ implies Ch j〈〈 j:a〉〉⊤, i.e., in that
case j indeed has the intention to perform a.
Given the above definitions, by means of valid
equivalences of ABC logic we obtain:
Trust(i,pi,ϕ) ↔ Beli
(
〈〈pi〉〉⊤∧ (〈〈pi〉〉⊤→ 〈pi〉⊤)∧ [pi]ϕ
)
↔ Beli
(
〈〈pi〉〉⊤∧〈pi〉⊤∧ [pi]ϕ
)
↔ Beli
(
〈〈pi〉〉⊤∧ [pi]ϕ
)
In words, i’s trust that the complex action pi is going to
be performed and produces ϕ reduces to a belief of i
that pi is going to occur and that ϕ is among the effects
of pi.
6 CASE STUDY IN OUR LOGIC
We now provide an analysis of the elements of the
PIMS case study in ABC logic. First, the set of agents
I = {i, j,k, . . . } should be the set of PIMS.
Second, the propositional language should encode
the agents’ knowledge about the other agents’ per-
sonal data. For every relevant data label d in the set
D = {d1,d2, . . . ,dn} (as introduced in Section 2) and
agents i and j, we introduce a propositional variable
pi jd expressing that i knows the value of the data la-
bel d of agent j. Therefore the set of propositional
variables is an extension of the set of knowledge vari-
ables: we have that pi jd ∈ P for every i, j ∈ I and d ∈ D
We should guarantee that positive and negative in-
trospection hold for these variables, i.e., we expect
pi jd → Beli pi jd and ¬pi jd → Beli¬pi jd to hold for
every propositional variable pi jd.
3 We assume that
agents are sincere when they inform about a name:
an agent i can inform an agent j of the name of the
agent k only if i knows j’s name. We therefore expect
〈i:+pj k name〉⊤→ p i k name to hold.
Using this formalization, Bob’s query can be
translated into a formula expressing the knowledge
about Alice he would like to have:
p bob alice name∧ (p bob alice toefl∨ p bob alice pge) ∧
∧(p bob alice letterduval )
Anonymity means that α will not make Bob’s name
available to whom ignored it before:
∧
a∈I
¬pa bob name →¬〈〈α〉〉pa bob name
where α is one of the three possible compositions. We
also assume the use of a set of propositional variables
to represent Bob preferences (like having Mr. Duval
letter certified by him (certif), or obtaining an old en-
glish test (old), likewise, feepaid is a propositional
variable related to the cost of (pro.cv()).
The complex actions that are proposed by the ser-
vice composition module are the following:
Alice.cv() :{(alice:+pbob alice name),
(alice:+pbob alice pge),
(alice:+p bob alice letterduval )}
Pro.cv() :if feepaid then {pro:+pbob alice name,
({pro:+pbob alice pge),
({pro:+pbob alice letterduval )} else fail
Composition1() :
{({alice:+pbob alice name), ({alice:+p bob duval name)};
{(toe f l:+p bob alice toefl)};
if p bob duval name then
{(duval:+pbob alice duvalrecommandation),
(bob:+pduval bob name)} else skip
The trust analysis process introduced in section 3
is reduced to the satisfiability checking of the trust
predicates, associated to the composed actions and the
goal of Bob, the abduction mechanism allows us to
3Note that while ¬Beli¬pi jd → pi jd follows from that,
the formula Beli pi jd → pi jd does not. The reason is that the
modal operators Beli do not obey the D axiom Beli pi jd →
¬Beli¬pi jd .
associate, to the trust decision, a possible explanation
to present to the user, where:
For Alice.cv(): trust towards this execution
fails, since the recommendation letter is not certified
(which can be remarked by observing that alice is the
one who assigned p bob duval name to true).
For Composition1(): trust towards this exe-
cution will also fail, because the privacy require-
ment is not met (due to the fact that bob has to put
pduval bob name to true during the execution).
For Pro.cv(): this composition satisfies all the
requirements for a positive trust value, but Bob is noti-
fied that there is a fee (by the necessity to have feepaid
true).
7 CONCLUSIONS AND
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have presented a case study related
to social professional networks using a SOA design,
where we have demonstrated, how a symbolic ap-
proach can model interactions, particularly how an
agent can manage his trust in a composed service. We
believe that our work can be used as a ground both for
theoretical and conceptual study of the application of
formal methods to service-oriented design.
As for the theoretical part, our logic can be ex-
tended in order to handle more complex interactions,
the most relevant way to do so would be to extend the
set of action constructors in a way that preserves the
decidability of the logic.
A conceptual extension of our work can corre-
spond to the study of how our logic can be used to
represent concepts involved in service oriented de-
sign. Such concepts can be related to resource man-
agement, interaction protocols and access policies.
We hope that our work can be used as a proof that
formal verification brings an interesting perspective
over service-oriented design, where formal specifica-
tion can be used both to prove properties of some SOA
application, while defining a blueprint to implement
intelligent agents interacting in an open environment.
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